What Is Religion?

What is religion? This question is posed by German scholar of religion Michael Bergunder in the latest issue of the journal Method & Theory in the Study of Religions. Bergunder points out that it is problematic that religious studies has not managed to agree on a single common definition of religion. If we lack such consensus, Bergunder asks, how can we then legitimize ourselves as an independent discipline?

Attempts to reach consensus can be summarized in three strategies: The first is to find a definition that unites everyone. The second strategy is to abandon the requirement that such a definition is needed. The third is to discard the concept of religion once and for all and replace it with another concept, for example 'culture.'

For Bergunder, none of these strategies are satisfactory. The last one is based on the claim that the concept of religion is Eurocentric and imperialist, but thereby fails to acknowledge that it has today become a global concept. The second strategy is, according to Bergunder, 'intellectually unsatisfying.'

The first - and most widespread - typically takes as its starting point what are assumed to be typical examples of religions, such as Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Despite criticism, it has not been explained why these are understood as typical examples.

This is where Bergunder's contribution to the discussion comes in. Drawing on poststructuralist discussions in the field, he argues that we must distinguish between Religion 1 and Religion 2: Religion 1 is the phenomenon explained in various definitions of religion. Religion 2 is everyday understandings of religion that are often used to legitimize these definitions.

For example, definitions of religion that include gods have been criticized because Buddhism is claimed to be a godless religion, but it is not explained why Buddhism is a religion in the first place. If everyday understandings of religion are to legitimize definitions, we must explain how such everyday understandings arise.

This is not only an interesting perspective for scholars of religion, but also in public conversations about religion and in other research disciplines. By researching how something is given the name 'religion' and why something is understood as religious (and something as non-religious), we will not only find diversity, but also be able to uncover certain power relations.

Bergunder draws on theoretical perspectives from Ernesto Laclau's political theory, Judith Butler's idea of the performative, and Michel Foucault's genealogical perspective. It therefore feels unreasonable to summarize his exposition in one sentence, but simply put: Naming something as 'religion' is a social act. It is part of the creation of identity, which in turn is a way of exercising power, and which after repeated instances becomes sedimented and ascribed its own history. This opens up a whole range of new studies and interesting approaches.

This perspective applies not only to religion, but also to religions. Currently relevant is, for example, the ongoing discussion about whether 'the Islamic State' (IS) has anything to do with religion. Naming the violence as 'religious' is a social act that connects to Islam as 'a religion,' and thus to everyone who identifies with it.

In the claim that IS 'has nothing to do with religion, but is politically motivated,' not only is an (artificial) distinction created between religion and politics, but the possibility is also excluded that those involved have motives that can be attributed to everything that throughout history has been called 'Islam.'